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ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND THE TERMINALLY
ILL: HOW SHOULD WASHINGTON DECIDE?
Dying is not what it used to be. Today nearly ninety percent of all
Americans succumb to chronic degenerative conditions rather than to
sudden death. 1 Death usually occurs in hospitals and nursing homes where
life-support technology offers the ability to keep some terminally ill
patients2 alive almost indefinitely.3 Because of these developments, how-
ever, many people now fear dying more than death. 4
Since the landmark decision of In re Quinlan5 in 1976, most legal
authorities and health practitioners have reached a consensus that termi-
nally ill patients possess the right to forego at least some forms of life-
1. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 16-18
(1983) [hereinafter cited as PRsIDENr's COMM'N]. In the early 1900's, infectious diseases were the
leading causes of death. Id.
2. For the purposes of this Comment, terminal illness means an incurable condition caused by
injury, disease, or illness from which there is no reasonable chance of recovery or cure, and which will,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death in the foreseeable future, in the absence of life-
sustaining treatment. See Cohen, Interdisciplinary Consultation on the Care of the Critically Ill and
Dying: The Role of One Hospital Ethics Committee, 10 CRITICAL CARE MED. 776, 781 (1982). See infra
notes 22, 98, 133 for the Washington courts' interpretation of "life-sustaining treatment;" see infra
notes 197-201 and accompanying text for the legislature's definition of "life-sustaining treatment."
(Compare the term "terminal condition" used in Washington's Natural Death Act discussed infra note
198 and accompanying text.)
This Comment includes among the terminally ill those persons in a persistent vegetative state. The
term "persistent vegetative state" refers to a form of unconsciousness arising from severe disruption of
the coordinated functions of the brain caused by a physical or chemically induced injury. Ingvar, Brun,
Johansson & Samuelson, Survival after Severe Cerebral Anoxia with Destruction of the Cerebral
Cortex: The Apallic Syndrome, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Scl. 184 (1978). Patients in a persistent
vegetative state may appear wakeful and their brain stems maintain subsistence activities and reflexes,
however, they suffer a complete loss of the higher functions of speech, voluntary muscular activity,
directed emotions, and signs of memory. Id. at 202. Detectable electroencephalograph (EEG) activity
may or may not occur. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 175. If nutrition is supplied to persons in a
persistent vegetative state, the vegetative functions of sleep/wake cycles, respiration, circulation,
temperature control, and uncontrolled excretion and evacuation will continue. Id.
3. Childress, Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment by Adults, 23 J. FAm. L. 191, 194 (1984-85).
Probably 80% of the deaths in the United States now occur in hospitals and long term care facilities such
as nursing homes. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 16-18.
4. Cassel, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Implications for Policy in 1985, 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 287,288 (1984) ("[Flrom the growth of available [medical] techniques. . . [a] new
public consciousness, fearful to the extreme of 'being kept alive as a vegetable,' began to demand death
with dignity."). See also Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 556, 571, 574-75 (1985). Ethicists, too, have noted the social implications of
prolonging dying by artificial means. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 776: "Unless we answer such
questions [regarding. life-sustaining care] now, our ICU's will become the cemeteries of the future,
occupied by multitudes of artificially fed and maintained human beings who are neither alive nor dead."
5. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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sustaining treatment. 6 Moreover, most agree that the decision to turn off a
respirator, or to authorize a "do not resuscitate" order, 7 can be made by a
surrogate acting on the patient's behalf.8 Considerable controversy exists,
however, over whether artificial nutrition and hydration can be foregone. 9
Are intravenous (IV) lines and feeding tubes different from other medical
interventions that patients have a right to refuse? Do health care providers
6. See, e.g., Comment, The Conflict Continues: Who Decides Treatment Questions for the
Terminally-Ill Incompetent Patient, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 641 (1984); Otten, New 'Wills' Allow People
to Reject Prolonging of Life in Fatal Illness, Wall St. J., July 2, 1985, at 35, col. 4.
7. A "do not resuscitate" (DNR) order in a patient's chart means that in the event ofcardiopulmon-
ary arrest or respiratory failure, the patient is not to be revived. Bedsine, Decisions to Withhold
Treatmentfrom Nursing Home Residents, 31 J.AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 602,603 (1983). For an example of
the legal entanglements such an order can produce, see In re Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
8. E.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980) (husband
authorized to request withdrawal of wife's respirator and the entry ofa DNR order in wife's chart); John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452So. 2d 921,926 (Fla. 1984) (wife may authorize withdrawal
of husband's respirator); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 660-61, 663 (father may authorize withdrawal of
daughter's respirator); Leach v. Akron Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (1980)
(husband may authorize withdrawal of wife's respirator).
The rationale generally given by the courts for this result is that a different determination would render
patients' rights to bodily integrity and privacy worthless. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 ("If a
putative decision by [a patient to forego life-sustaining treatment]. . . is regarded as a valuable incident
of her privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition
prevents her conscious exercise of the choice."); In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 124,660 P.2d 738, 744
(1983) ("An incompetent's right to refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do so.").
Most commentators support some kind of surrogate decisionmaking process. E.g., Cantor, Quinlan,
Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERs L. REV. 243, 252 (1977)
(argument suggesting that surrogate decisionmakers cannot exercise a patient's personal choice and
autonomy is "too simplistic"; self-determination is in fact promoted by allowing a guardian to implement
a patient's wishes). The President's Commission has suggested that the principle of "promoting patient
welfare" underlies surrogate decisionmaking in the absence of any previously expressed wishes by the
patient regarding terminal care. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 132-36. For a similar view see
Cantor, supra note 4, at 543, 557 (while it is presumptuous to purport to be effectuating patient choice
where a patient has never articulated personal preferences about the dying process, humane handling of
the dying requires that surrogates be allowed to make decisions forthese patients). See Chapman, Fateful
Treatment Choices for Critically Ill Adults Part 1: The Judicial Model, 37 ARK. L. REv. 908 (1984);
Privacy and the Family in Medical Care Decisions: A Symposium, 23 J. FAM. L. 172, 189, 207 (1985);
Rubin, Refusal ofLife-Sustaining Treatmentfor Terminally llllncompetentPatients: Court Orders and an
Alternative, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 19 (1985); Veatch, Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal: A
Reasonableness Standard, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 427 (1983). But see Smith, In re Quinlan: Defining tile
BasisforTerminating LifeSupport UndertheRightofPrivacy, 12TuLsAL.J. 150, 161(1976) (permitting a
guardian to make medical decisions for an incompetent patient actually interferes with the patient's right
of privacy); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-No ConstitutionalBasisExists to Permita Parent oAssertforHis
Adult Child a Right to Die, 7 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 716, 722 (1976) ("To allow a guardian to make such a
choice violates literally the essence of the right of self-determination," discussing the Chancery Court's
opinion in In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975)).
9. See, e.g., Note, The Barber Decision: A Questionable Approach to Termination of Life Support
Systemsfor the Patient in a Persistent Vegetative State, 15 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 371, 380 (1985); Otten,
supra note 6.
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have an obligation, or a right, to give such care despite a patient's or
surrogate's decision to the contrary?
Our society attaches considerable emotional significance to providing
food and water to those unable to care for themselves. Feeding is an
expression of nurturing and caring; 10 the intentional denial of sustenance to
the dying is repugnant to widely held notions of providing proper, "ordi-
nary" care that health care providers have a duty to give. 1 ' This attitude has
led some to contend that nutrition is a basic element of human existence; it
is never extraordinary, and therefore, never optional. 12
The Washington courts have never adjudicated the right of a terminally
ill patient to forego artificial nutrition and hydration. Nor does Washing-
ton's living will statute, the Natural Death Act (NDA), 13 address this matter
with specificity. Both the state supreme court14 and the legislature, 15
however, have recognized the fundamental right of all adult persons to
make decisions about their own medical care, including the freedom to
choose nontreatment that will inevitably lead to death. Because a termi-
nally ill patient's right to forego artificial sustenance is consistent with this
broad right, Washington case law and statutory authority appear to support
the right of terminally ill citizens of this state or their surrogates to decide to
forego artificial nutrition and hydration. 16
Nonetheless, the matter is far from settled. State lawmakers could
amend Washington's NDA to prohibit the withholding or withdrawing of
artificial nutrition and hydration from terminally ill patients.17 Thirteen
10. Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (1983).
11. See infra note 67.
12. Id.
On March 16, 1986, the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
announced a new opinion on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. In that opinion,
the Council stated, "[ilife [sustaining] medical treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly
comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its
burdens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained." Memorandum from the
American Medical Ass'n to FEDNET (Mar. 17, 1986) (discussing life-prolonging treatment) (copy on
file with the Washington Law Review).
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122 (1985). Sqe infra text accompanying notes 195-203. In 1979,
Washington became the ninth state to enact living will legislation. Today, 35 states and the District of
Columbia have living will laws. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
14. In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.010 (1985).
16. See infra notes 123-222 and accompanying text.
17. S.S.B. 3228, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1985 Washington. Introduced as S.B. 3228, this bill,
which would have substantially amended Washington's NDA, originally contained no mention of
nutrition. The language "[life-sustaining treatment] shall not include the provision of basic nutrition by
whatever route necessary" was added on the Senate floor. This language was later rejected by the House
Committee on Social and Health Services. Subsequently, however, E.S.S.B. 3228 encountered
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new living will statutes enacted by other states last year included such a
prohibition. 18 Further, Washington courts could retreat from the broad
language of In re Colyer19 and In re Hamlin20 in which the supreme court
held that all terminally ill patients have a common law and constitutionally
based right to forego medical treatment that only prolongs their dying. 21
Artificial nutrition and hydration were not clearly at issue in either deci-
sion: the facts in those cases establish only that patients in a persistent
vegetative state can forego mechanical ventilation, antibiotics, and car-
diopulmonary resuscitation. 22 Recent decisions in Massachusetts 23 and
Florida24 have held that feeding tubes could not be withdrawn from per-
sistently vegetative patients despite earlier decisions in those jurisdictions
permitting similar patients to forego mechanical ventilation, 25 hemo-
dialysis,26 chemotherapy 27 and cardiopulmonary resuscitation.2 8
unexpected resistence in the House Rules Committee and failed to reach the House floor. This vote was
taken shortly after a Sunday Seattle newspaper headline: Powell, Two Families' Decision: Letting Loved
Ones Starve, Seattle Times, Apr. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
When the second session of the 49th Legislature convened in January, 1986, this bill resurfaced in the
Senate. After passing the Senate in the same form as it had in 1985, the bill went to the House
Committee on Social and Health Services which again amended the Senate version. Despite the
recommendation of the Nursing Home Advisory Council-a task force assembled to review E.S.S.B.
3228 during the fall of 1985 which called for artificial nutrition and hydration to be specified as a life-
sustaining procedure-the version reported out of this House committee contained the language life-
sustaining treatment "does not include nutrition for comfort care in the alleviation of pain." Once
again, however, the bill failed in the House Rules Committee and was not reported out.
18. Otten, supra note 6.
19. 99 Wn. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 728 (1983).
20. 102 Wn. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
21. Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d at 816, 689 P.2d at 1376; Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 118-19, 660 P.2d at 741.
22. Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d at 814, 689 P.2d at 1375. In Colyer it is not clear which life-sustaining
treatments were precisely at issue. Bertha Colyer's husband petitioned the court for "removal of [her]
life support systems." Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 117, 660 P.2d at 740. The court specifically mentioned
"respirator" only twice in its opinion, id. at 116, 660 P.2d at 740; throughout the remainder of the
opinion the court spoke generally of "life-sustaining treatment." See infra note 133 and accompanying
text. However, the court compared Bertha Colyer's medical care to that of Karen Quinlan, stating: "For
Karen Quinlan, the degree of bodily invasion was great, since she required a respirator, an intravenous
feeding apparatus, a catheter, and intensive nursing care. . . . Similar intrusive care was required for
Bertha Colyer." 99 Wn. 2d at 122-23, 660 P.2d at 743 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Colyer court
may have included artificial sustenance in its holding. However, as artificial nutrition and hydration
were not clearly at issue in Colyer, this Comment takes the position that Colyer left the artificial
nutrition question unanswered.
23. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., No. 85E0009-GI (Mass. P. Ct. Oct. 21, 1985) (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review).
24. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, No. 84-5627CA-JRT (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1985) (copy on file with
the Washington Law Review).
25. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
26. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
27. Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
28. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
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Society's general aversion to death29 is especially pronounced in argu-
ments that favor legislative and judicial mandates to preclude artificial
nutrition and hydration from the field of patient choice.30 Providing suste-
nance to the dying is emotionally appealing. Furthermore, many terminally
ill patients are incompetent and thus unable to participate in decisions
about their medical care. 31 Some proponents of the requirement that
artificial nutrition and hydration be provided to all patients question
whether a surrogate should make the decision to withhold treatment on
behalf of an incompetent patient. 32
Despite these sentiments, most legal and medical authorities recognize
that the dying patient may be in greater need of emotional comfort and
dignity than of aggressive medical intervention.33 Modern medical ethics
do not require that life be sustained in all circumstances. 34 Some courts and
legislators have asserted specifically that artificial nutrition and hydration
need not be given in all cases. 35
Legal decisions about the right of terminally ill patients to refuse
artificial sustenance involve complex policies that are difficult to define and
to develop in a society with widely differing moral philosophies. The
solution must not come by picking one voice from an emotional shouting
match. In order for Washington courts to resolve the issue when it arises, or
for state lawmakers to enact informed legislation, they must understand the
medical reality of artificial nutritional support, the right to forego artificial
nutrition and hydration as it exists in other jurisdictions, the legal develop-
ment in Washington of the right to forego life-sustaining treatment, and the
bases supporting a right to refuse artificial sustenance that derive from the
29. See Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REv. 239 (1970).
30. See Towers, Irreversible Coma and Withdrawal of Life Support: is it Murder if the IV line is
Disconnected?, 8 J. MED. ETHIcs 203 (1983) (discussing the pre-trial behavior of public interest groups
confronted with termination-of-care issues). Consider also the titles to the following recent legal
commentaries: Note, Suicide, Euthanasia, Murder: The Line Blurs, 15 GOLDEW4 GATE L. Rev. 407
(1985); Note, Withholding Food and Water From a Patient-Should it be Condoned in California, 16
PAc. L. J. 877 (1985). But see Note, supra note 9, at 371.
31. PRESmENfr's COMM'N, supra note 1, at 120-26; Cantor, supra note 4, at 557; Rubin, supra note
8, at 23.
32. See supra note 8.
33. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 190; Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always
Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (Oct. 1983).
34. Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig & van Eys, The
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEw ENo. J. MED. 955, 958 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Wanzer]. See also Cantor, supra note 4, at 573.
35. For court decisions, see infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. For legislation addressing
artificial nutrition, see, for example, Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act, 1985 Ariz. Legis. Serv.
ch. 199, § 36-3201(4) (West), which states: "Life-sustaining procedure does not include the administra-
tion of medication, food or fluids or the performance of a medical procedure deemed necessary to
provide comfort care." This language suggests that if artificial nutrition and hydration were not needed
for comfort care, they qualify as life-sustaining procedures under the Act.
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policy and rights underlying the general right to forego life-sustaining
treatment.
This Comment demonstrates that artificial nutrition and hydration are
life-sustaining treatments which all patients have a right to forego under
Washington's common law, state constitution, and NDA. Countervailing
state interests do not compel a contrary result. Moreover, artificial nutrition
and hydration do not require the preclusion of surrogate decisionmaking
already recognized by Washington in the life-sustaining treatment context.
However, since current judicial guidelines for surrogate-made decisions
are inadequate, this Comment concludes by proposing substantive guide-
lines for such decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Medical Reality of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
Ingestion-the means by which food and water enter the gastrointestinal
(GI) tract-usually occurs as the result of coordinated muscular move-
ments: placing food and water into the mouth, chewing, and swallowing.
From the GI tract, nutrients are absorbed into the blood. 36 For patients
unable to ingest food voluntarily, 37 or for patients whose GI tract is
nonfunctional, 38 water and nutrients can be mechanically placed into the
GI tract for absorption, or directly into the blood stream. 39 Patients unable
to ingest water and nutrients voluntarily, like patients unable to breathe
spontaneously, will die in the absence of artificial support. 40
36. J. CROUCH, FUNCTIONAL HUMAN ANATOMY 496-98 (3d ed. 1978).
37. Comatose, severely demented, and persistently vegetative patients cannot eat and drink by
themselves. See Lo & Dornbrand, Sounding Board: Guiding the Hand that Feeds, Caring for tile
Demented Elderly, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 402,403 (1984); Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 17-18
(discussing the ethics and medical implications of withholding food and water); Meguid, Eldar &
Wahba, The Delivery of Nutritional Support: A Potpourri of New Devices and Methods, 55 CANCER
279, 280 (Jan. 1 Supp. 1985) (describing the methods of supplying artificial sustenance to those unable
to feed themselves).
38. Chronically debilitated patients may have a reduced ability to absorb nutrients from their GI
tracts. Meguid & Williams, The Use of Gastrostomy to Correct Malnutrition, 149 SURG. GYN. & OBST.
27 (1979). But some debilitated patients do gain weight from artificial nutritional support. O'Hara,
Kennedy & Lizewski, Effects of Long Term Elemental Nasogastric Feeding on Elderly Debilitated
Patients, 108 CAN. MED. A. J. 977, 980 (1973).
39. Common means of artificial nutrition and hydration include: nasogastric tubes (see infra note
44 and accompanying text), gastrostomy tubes (see infra note 49 and accompanying text), intravenous
lines (see infra note 51 and accompanying text), and hyperalimentation (see infra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text).
40. See Lo & Dombrand, supra note 37, at 402. However, death in this fashion may not be painful or
uncomfortable. See Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 19; infra note 77. The starvation process is
described in Heymsfield, Bethel, Ansley, Nixon & Rudman, EnteralHyperalimentation:AnAlternative
to Central Venous Hyperalimentation, 90 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 63 (1979). The natural course of
dehydration is described in Zerwekh, The Dehydration Question, NURs. 83, Jan. 1983, at 47, 48.
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Medical technology has only recently provided effective methods of
artificial nutrition and hydration. 41 For many, these mechanical interven-
tions offer substantial benefit, such as the means to survive cancer treat-
ment,42 or the opportunity to resume activities of daily living despite an
otherwise fatal digestive disorder.43 Nevertheless, serious complications
may accompany each method of artificial nutrition and hydration.
The mechanical placement of nutrients into the GI tract necessarily
involves tubes. Nasogastric tubes which are inserted through the nose and
pass into the stomach" can painfully irritate the patient, causing bleeding
and ulceration. 45 Tubes can be misplaced, which may lead to infection and
death. 46 Aspiration-induced pneumonia is a frequent complication in dis-
oriented patients;47 for such patients, physical restraints may be neces-
sary.48 Gastrostomies, which require surgical placement of a tube directly
into the patient's stomach, 49 may lead to leakage of acidic stomach contents
41. The first flexible tubing for instilling food and fluids into the stomach was developed about 100
years ago. Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 17; see also Torosian & Rombeau, Feeding by Tube
Enterostomy, 150 SURG. GYlN. & OBST. 918 (1980). The direct infusion of adequate nutrition into the
veins was introduced in 1968. Ota, Imbembo & Zuidema, Total Parenteral Nutrition, 83 SURGERY 503
(1980).
42. Kokal, The Impact of Antitumor Therapy on Nutrition, 55 CANcER 273 (Jan. 1 Supp. 1985).
43. Torosian &Rombeau, supra note 41, at 918; Padilla& Grant, PsychosocialAspects ofArtificial
Feeding, 55 CANCER 301 (Jan. 1 Supp. 1985).
44. Heymsfield, Bethel, Ansley, Nixon & Rudman, supra note 40, at 67.
45. Meguid, Eldar & Wahba, supra note 37, at 280.
46. Hand, Kempster, Levy, Rogol & Spirn, Inadvertent Transbronchial Insertion of Narrow-Bore
Feeding Tubes into the Pleural Space, 251 J. A.M.A. 2396, 2397 (1984). Feeding tubes have been
placed inadvertently into the brain and have perforated the esophagus, lung, and stomach; these
complications most frequently occur among neurologically impaired patients. Id. Many terminally ill
patients will fit this category. See supra note 2. See also Schorlemmer & Battaglini, An Unusual
Complication of Naso-Enteral Feeding with Small-Diameter Feeding Tubes, 199 ANNALS SURG. 104
(1984). Tube misplacement can lead to infection and the presence of air in the chest cavity outside the
lung. Schorlemmer & Battaglini, supra, at 106.
Other problems include bacterial colonization of the nutrient-rich feeding solution which can cause
intestinal infection and poisoning. Anderton, MicrobialAspects of the Preparation andAdministration
of Nasogastric and Nasoenteric Tube Feeds in Hospitals-A Review, 37A HUMAN NUTRMON: APPLIED
NutrRmON 426 (1983). Metabolic complications can arise from a patient's inability to assimilate large
volume fluid and nutrient loads due to heart, liver, or kidney insufficiency. Heymsfield, Bethel, Ansley,
Nixon & Rudman, supra note 40, at 69. Fluid overload, congestive heart failure, electrolyte imbalance,
and dehydration are among other problems reported. Id. Adverse gastrointestinal symptoms include
vomiting, bloating, cramping, and diarrhea. Id.
47. Aspiration-induced pneumonia arises when food or saliva is aspirated into the lungs, causing
infection. Meguid, Eldar & Wahba, supra note 37, at 281; Torosian & Rombeau, supra note 41, at 921.
48. Demented or restless patients are often tied down and sedated to prevent them from pulling out
their tubes. Id. See also Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 18.
49. See Meguid & Williams, supra note 38, at 27-28 (1979). Gastrostomies require local or
general anesthesia; liquified food is then infused through the tube. Id. Other types of tube feedings
include the esophagostomy (where the surgical opening is in the esophagus), the pharyngostomy
(where the opening is in the pharynx), or thejejunostomy (where the opening is in the jejunal region of
the intestine). Torosian & Rombeau, supra note 41, at 919-21.
425
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causing sores and infection. 50
Methods which infuse fluids and nutrients directly into the circulatory
system also entail significant risks. First, IV lines can provide short term
support only.51 Veins become irritated and infected, and collapse.52 Hyper-
alimentation 53, although it can be used to administer adequate nutrients
indefinitely, necessitates surgical intervention 54 and followup professional
care. 55 As with other forms of artificial nutrition and hydration, resistant
patients receiving this treatment must be physically restrained. 56
Nasogastric tubes, IV lines, and hyperalimentation artifically replace
the natural function of ingestion. Each method is physically invasive and
involves significant risk. The medical reality of artificial nutrition and
hydration bears little resemblance to ordinary oral consumption of food and
water. 57
B. The Right to Forego Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: Current
Status of the Law
In the case of In re Quinlan,58 the New Jersey Supreme Court became the
50. Rigdon & Kukora, Management of Leakage from Gastrostomy Sites, 49 Ast. SURG. 531
(1983). Other complications associated with the surgical placement of enteral tubes include wound
opening, herniation, fistula development, peritonitis, hemorrhage, and nerve damage. Torosian &
Rombeau, supra note 41, at 919-21.
51. Meguid, Elder & Wahba, supra note 37, at 284. In peripheral IV therapy, fluid and nutrient
solutions are infused directly into the body's circulatory system by way of small, temporary steel or
plastic needles commonly inserted into the superficial veins of a patient's arms and hands. Id.
52. Even with frequent site rotation, venous inflammation, pain, and discomfort may occur.
Tomford, Hershey, McLaren, Porter & Cohen, Intravenous Therapy Team and Peripheral Venous
Catheter-Associated Complications, 144 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1191, 1194 (1984). During prolonged
hospitalizations, repeated episodes of inflammation cause veins to harden and collapse, resulting in the
need for more invasive procedures. Id. Inflammation may also lead to infection and death. Id.
53. Hyperalimentation involves the infusion of high-density nutrient-rich solutions directly into a
large diameter, high flow blood vessel by the placement of a plastic catheter into the vessel or into the
heart's right atrium by inserting a right atrial catheter. Meguid, Eldar& Wahba, supra note 37, at 286-87;
Ota, Imbembo & Zuidema, supra note 41, at 511. Catheters used to administer hyperalimentation can
remain in the body for longerperiods than can IV needles. Meguid, Eldar& Wahba, supra note 37, at 286.
54. Meguid, Eldar& Wahba, supra note 37, at 286-87; Ota, Imbembo &Zuidema, supra note 41,
at 511.
55. Ota, Imbembo & Zuidema, supra note 41, at 512-14. Central venous clotting and infection are
common problems. Id. Frequent dressing changes and insertion site wound care are required. Id.
Potential for metabolic complications demands daily monitoring. Id. See also Thompson, Madison &
Hodges, The Incidence and Complications of Total Parenteral Nutrition, 68 NEB. MED. J. 321 (1983).
56. Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 18.
57. As one ethicist commented, "[ilf withdrawal of IV fluids from a deeply comatose patient is
considered equivalent to denying food and water to a conscious patient and thereby 'starving him to
death' . . . then we might as well be with Alice in Wonderland, playing crazy croquet with the red
queen." Towers, supra note 30, at 205.
58. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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first appellate tribunal to assert that all patients possess a federal constitu-
tional right to privacy that includes a right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment.59 The court also held that the patient's father, as surrogate decision-
maker, could request the withdrawal of Quinlan's respirator. 60
Subsequently, other cases have recognized a common law right to freedom
from nonconsensual invasions of bodily integrity as an alternative basis for
the right to refuse treatment. 61
Since then, seven courts have decided cases involving requests for
authorization to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration.
The right to forego artificial sustenance was affirmed in five of these
decisions. In 1980, a Delaware chancery court followed the state's supreme
court direction to authorize withdrawing a nasogastric tube from a patient
rendered comatose in an automobile accident. 62 In 1983, a California
appellate court dismissed criminal charges against two physicians who
withdrew IV hydration from a post-operatively brain damaged patient. 63 In
1984, a Massachusetts appellate court refused to overturn a lower court
determination that a gastrostomy tube should not be placed in a terminally
ill patient for whom the burdens of gastrostomy feeding would outweigh
any reasonably expected benefit;64 and a New York trial court held that a
competent, elderly nursing home patient could refuse all means of medical
nutrition. 65 Finally, in 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
semiconscious, seriously ill nursing home patient had the right to forego
artificial feeding under certain circumstances. 66 The courts in these cases
generally equated artificial nutrition and hydration with other forms of
59. 355 A.2d at 663-64.
60. Id.
61. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417,424 (1977) (existing law recognizes the interest of the individual in preserving the inviolability of
the person); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985) (the right to decline medical
treatment is embraced within the common law right to self-determination); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (common law
recognizes right of patient to control personal medical treatment); In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 121-22,
660 P.2d 738,743 (1983) (the common law right to be free from bodily invasion is one basis for the right
to forego life-sustaining treatment) (see discussion infra notes 84-111, 123-37 and accompanying text).
62. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (following 421 A.2d
1334 (Del. 1980)).
63. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
64. In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200,464 N.E. 2d 959, appeal denied, 392 Mass. 1102,465 N.E. 2d
261 (1984). The lower court later received more medical information and changed its initial determina-
tion that a gastrostomy tube should not be implanted. See Annas, The Care of Mary Hier: When
Substituted Judgment Becomes Sleight of Hand, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 25 (1984).
65. In re Plaza Health (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Cty. of Onandaga, Feb. 6, 1984) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review).
66. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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life-sustaining treatment that patients already possessed the established
right to forego. 67 While acknowledging that the state had interests that
might weigh against the patient's right to refuse treatment, 68 the courts
considered the procedures invasive 69 and the patient's prognosis poor70 in
67. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983); Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156, 157 (Del. Ch. 1980); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, No.
84-5627CA-JRT, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1985); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., No.
85E0009-GI, slip op. at 13-15 (Mass. P. Ct. Oct., 21, 1985); In re Heir, 18 Mass. App. 200,464 N.E.2d
959, 961-62, appeal denied, 392 Mass. 1102,465 N.E. 2d 261 (1984); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1236; In re
Plaza Health, slip op. at 3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Cty. of Onandaga Feb. 6, 1984). Courts have specifically
noted that artificial nutrition and hydration are analogous to mechanical ventilators (respirators) in that
each treatment replaces a biological function, and neither addresses the patient's underlying condition.
E.g., Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
Still it has been argued that since nutrition is basic to life, artificial nutrition and hydration is
"ordinary," and therefore obligatory care that health care providers have a duty to give. Cantor, supra
note 4, at 552; Callahan, supra note 10. See also Micetich, Steinecker & Thomasma, Are Intravenous
Fluids Morally Required for a Dying Patient? 143 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 975 (1983) (some clinicians
consider IV fluids ordinary care, as opposed to extraordinary care, and therefore, believe themselves
required to provide such care). But see Strong, Can Fluids and Electrolytes be 'Extraordinary'
Treatment?, 7 J. MED. ETHICS 83 (1981) (even if the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is used,
"ordinariness" falls along a continuum: any distinction should be made in the context of particular
case). When first defined in the literature, ordinary care included all medicines, treatments, and
operations which offered the patient a reasonable hope of benefit, and which could be used without
excessive pain, expense, or inconvenience to the patient. Comment, supra note 6, at 650 n.43.
According to this scheme, only care that constitutes "extraordinary" care is medical treatment that
health care personnel may opt not to provide and patients may opt not to accept. E.g., McCormick, The
Quality ofLife, The Sanctity ofLife, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 1978; Rubin, supra note 8, at 36 & 36
n.95. As originally defined, extraordinary care was treatment that could not be obtained without
excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or that if used, would not offer the patient a reasonable
hope of benefit. Comment, supra note 6, at 650 n.43.
Most legal authorities, however, now reject the ordinary/extraordinary care distinction and favor its
replacement by a case-by-case evaluation of whether the burdens of a proposed treatment outweigh, or
are disproportionate to, its benefits to the patient. Note, supra note 9, at 379. See also Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. Modem usage of the distinction is
confusing: It ignores the benefit component of "ordinary" care, and fails to recognize that individual
patient circumstances determine whether care is required or optional. See id. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 82-90. Moreover, what for one patient is ordinary care, such as mechanical ventilation
for a curable patient, may be extraordinary for another. See generally id. at 88-89; Micetich, Steinecker
& Thomasma, supra at 975; Towers, supra note 30, at 203-05; Veatch, supra note 8, at 433; Note, I. V.
Withdrawal: The Severance of Medicine's or Society's Umbilical Cord?, 63 NEB. L. REv. 941,960-91
(1984).
68. E.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223-26. See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the
CompetentAdult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,1(1975). See also infra notes 100-10, 170-94 and accompany-
ing text.
69. E.g., Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (court's approach to surrogate decisionmaking included a
consideration of intrusiveness, but even if the treatment is minimally invasive it need not be provided if
the patient's prognosis is hopeless); In re Plaza Health, slip op. at 4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Cty. of Onandaga
Feb. 6, 1984) ("I will not, against his wishes, in effect order this 85 or 86 year old person to be operated
upon and/or to be force fed in any manner, or to be restrained for the rest of his natural life. "). Courts
have also noted that artificial sustenance entails significant risk of complications. Hier, 464 N.E.2d at
961-62; Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1236. But see Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 85E0009-GI, slip
op. at 13-14 (Mass. P. Ct. Oct. 21, 1985) (though the surgical placement ofa gastrostomy tube subjects a
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concluding that the patient's right to self-determination should prevail. 71
In contrast, a Florida trial court refused to authorize withdrawing a
nasogastric tube from a patient in a persistent vegetative state, 72 despite
prior Florida decisions asserting that such patients had a constitutional
right to forego mechanical ventilation and antibiotics. 73 Similarly, a Mas-
sachusetts probate court recently held that a persistently vegetative pa-
tient's gastrostomy tube could not be withdrawn at his family's request,
even though the judge believed the patient, if competent, would have
wanted the tube removed. 74 The court did not find the patient's gastrostomy
tube especially invasive, 75 nor did it view the patient's persistent vegetative
state as a terminal illness. 76 The court also expressed concern with the
patient's potential for experiencing pain as a result of the withholding of
fluids. 77
patient to risks of hemorrhage and infection, once the opening heals, the risk of infection is remote).
70. E.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1218-19 (elderly nursing home resident suffering from serious and
permanent mental and physical impairments would probably die within one year).
71. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Ch. 1980) (incompetent
patient's privacy right increases as prognosis dims); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225-27 (incompetent patient
retains right to self-determination); In re Plaza Health (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Cty. of Onandaga Feb. 6, 1984)
(competent patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition prevails).
72. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, No. 84-5627CA-JRT (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1985). The trial court
relied on Florida's Life Prolonging Procedure Act which states, in part, that "life-prolonging pro-
cedure" shall not include the provision of sustenance, even while recognizing that "[i]t may be that
medical procedures to provide sustenance are more similar to other medical procedures than to typical
human ways of providing sustenance." Id.
73. John F. Kennedy Hospital. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
74. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., No. 85E0009-GI (Mass. P. Ct. Oct. 21, 1985).
75. Id., slip op. at 17-18.
76. Id., slip op. at 41. The Brophy court's finding that Mr. Brophy's persistent vegetative state did
not constitute a terminal illness is inconsistent with the findings of other courts on this issue, that
construe a persistent vegetative state as a terminal illness in that without the application of life-
sustaining treatment, the patient will die. See, e.g., In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 116-17,660 P.2d 739,
740 (1983). Compare Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, § 1 (9) (which uses the term "terminal
condition.") Under the Uniform Act, persistent vegetative state qualifies as a terminal condition in that
a patient in a persistent vegetative state would die in a "relatively short period" in the absence of life-
sustaining treatment. Id.
77. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., No. 85E0009-G1, slip op. at 29 (Mass. P. Ct. Oct 21, 1985).
The court ignored several considerations in reaching this result. First, foregoing artificial nutrition and
hydration will not always cause pain, especially for a comatose or persistent vegetative patient. Severns
v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 157 (Del. Ch. 1980); Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 19;
Zerwekh, supra note 40, at 51. Moreover, the pain and discomfort that may accompany clinical
dehydration and malnutrition can be controlled. PRESIDETr's COMM'N, supra note 1, at 19,278-86. For
patients unable to sense hunger and thirst, withholding feeding devices may not result in more pain than
the termination of any other medical treatment. See Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 19, 20. Finally,
for many terminally ill patients, the alternative, mechanical administration of nutrients and fluids, will
increase discomfort. Id. at 19; Zerwekh, supra note 40, at 51.
The Conroy court also considered the prospect that foregoing artificial sustenance might cause pain.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209, 1217-18, 1232 (1985). However, the court also realized that
the pain of a prolonged life with artificial nutrition and hydration may be greater than the pain of a
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Thirty-five state legislatures and the District of Columbia also have
addressed the right of terminally ill patients to forego life-sustaining
treatment.78 Some state statutes provide only the means for a competent
adult to execute a written directive stating that, in the event he or she
becomes terminally ill and incompetent, life-sustaining treatment is to be
withheld or withdrawn. 79 Nine states include additional procedures for
shorter life without. Id. at 1232, 1236. The court also noted that dehydration may not be distressing or
painful to a dying patient. Id. at 1236.
78. Alabama Natural Death Act, Ala. Code §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1981); Arizona Medical Treatment
Decision Act, 1985 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 199 (West) (to be codified as ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-3201 to -3210); Arkansas Death with Dignity, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (1977);
California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1976); Colorado
Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 15-18-101 to -113 (see also § 12-36-117) (1985);
Connecticut Death with Dignity Act, 1985 Conn. Acts 85-606 (Reg. Sess.); Delaware Death with
Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1982); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of
1981, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421 to -2430 (1982); Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.01-. 15 (1984); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1984); Idaho
Natural Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1977); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1/2 §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd 1984); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1985); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 1985 Iowa Legis.
Serv. 144A.l-144A.11 (West); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -109
(1980); Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures, LA. REV. STAT. 40:1299.58.01 to -. 10 (1984); Maine
Living Will Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, ch. 710a (1985); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act, MD. HEALTH GENERAL CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1985); Mississippi Act, Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-101 to -121(1984); Missouri Death Prolonging Procedures Act, 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. Senate
Bill No. 51 (Vernon); Montana Living Will Act., MONT. CODEANN. §§ 50-9-101 to-104, § 50-9-111,
§§ 50-9-202 to -206 (1985); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 449.540-.690 (1977); New Hampshire Living Wills Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137H:1-16 (1985); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1977); North
Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1977, amend. 1979, 1981,
1983); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (1985); Oregon Rights with
Respect to Terminal Illness, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1977, amend. 1983); Tennessee Right to a
Natural Death Act, 1985 Pub. Acts ch. 355; Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h
(Vernon 1977, amend. 1983); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1985); Vermont Terminal Care Document, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251-5262
and tit. 13 § 1801 (1982); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to -13 (1983);
Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010-.905 (1985); West Virginia Natural
Death Act, W. VA. CODE. ch. 16. art. 30 §§ 1-10 (1984); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, WIs. STAT. ANN.
§§ 154.01-.11 (1984); Wyoming Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (1984).
79. Following Quinlan, discussed supra text accompanying notes 58-60, California enacted the
first "living will" legislation. Since then, most otherstates have passed similar laws. See supra note 78.
No two are precisely alike. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHTTo DtE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL
PATIENT: LEGAL, MEDICAL AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES 39-41 (1985). In August 1985, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Commissioner's final draft of the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act [URTIA]. See Minutes, National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws: Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Aug. 2-9, 1985, at 384 (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review).
Some states, such as California, Colorado, and Pennsylvania, also have enacted Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care laws (DPAHC) which permit appointment of an agent for medical decision-
making if the appointing person becomes incapacitated. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra, at 43,
46, and 72. The President's Commission recommended that more states adopt DPAHC's because
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decisionmaking on behalf of incompetent patients who have not executed a
declaration.80 Living will statutes in eighteen states explicitly provide for
nutrition and hydration. 81 Ten of these living will laws clearly mandate
providing artificial nutrition and hydration in all circumstances. 82 Eight of
these statutes may require the provision of artificial sustenance only when
needed for patient comfort. 83
II. COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR THE
RIGHT TO FOREGO ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND
HYDRATION IN WASHINGTON
A. The Cases
In two recent decisions, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
right of all adult persons to make decisions about their own medical care,
including the freedom to choose nontreatment when death will result.
Absent countervailing state interests, which may outweigh an individual's
right to forego treatment in some circumstances, neither opinion suggested
that artificial nutrition and hydration is excluded from patient choice.
1. In re Colyer
In re Colyer84 provided the first opportunity for the Washington Supreme
Court to affirm that all terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to
refuse medical care that merely prolongs their dying. 85 There, a car-
diopulmonary arrest had left sixty-nine year old Bertha Colyer in a per-
sistent vegetative state, her body supported by artificial means. 86 As his
"[piroxy directives allow patients to control decisionmaking in a far broader range of cases than the
instruction directives authorized by most existing natural death acts." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note
1, at 145. Washington's Durable Power of Attorney law does not, on its face, apply to medical matters.
WASH. REv. CODE § 11.94 (1983).
80. Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Vir-
ginia. For statutory citations, see supra note 78.
81. Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For
statutory citations, see supra note 78.
82. Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Oregon,
and Wisconsin. For statutory citations see supra note 78. For an example, see Wisconson's Natural
Death Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b): "Life-sustaining procedure" does not include "[t]he
provision of fluid maintenance and nutritional support."
83. Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. For
example, see text of Arizona's statute, supra note 35. For statutory citations, see supra note 78.
84. 99 Wn. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
85. Id. at 118-19, 660 P.2d at 741.
86. Id. at 116-17, 660 P.2d at 740.
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wife's guardian, Mr. Colyer brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
authorization to remove Bertha Colyer's life support systems. 87 Even
though Bertha Colyer's condition precluded her participation in the deci-
sion to terminate care and she had never executed a directive under
Washington's NDA, her family believed her to be a very independent
woman who would have refused medical care had she been able to do So.88
Accordingly, despite the personal nature of the right to forego life-sustain-
ing intervention, 89 the court elected to permit exercise of the right by a
surrogate decisionmaker, rather than foreclose its assertion altogether. 90
The Colyer court based its recognition of the right to forego life-
sustaining treatment on alternative grounds. First, the court concluded that
a federal constitutional right to privacy encompassed the right of terminally
ill patients to forego life-sustaining treatment. 9' The court relied on pre-
vious decisions in other states92 and Justice Douglas' statement in Doe v.
Bolton93 that privacy included the "freedom to care for one's health and
person. " 94 The court then carefully articulated its findings of state action,
87. Id.
88. Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 745.
89. The right to privacy and the right to be free from nonconsensual invasions of bodily integrity
are individual rights. See id. at 124, 660 P.2d at 744. It has been argued that because these rights are
attributed to the individual, they are personal and nontransferable, and cannot be exercised by someone
else. See supra note 8.
90. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 124, 660 P.2d at 744, states:
An incompetent's right to refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do so. No
court has denied an individual this right because of incompetency to exercise it: '[H]er right of
privacy. . . should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents herconscious
exercise of the choice.' (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d at 664). 'The recognition of that
[privacy] right must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because
the value of human dignity extends to both.' (quoting Saikeivicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417,
427).
In re Hamlin subsequently modified Colyer, eliminating the need for guardianship appointment if
family members are available to act for the patient. 102 Wn. 2d 810, 818, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377 (1984).
See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
91. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 119-20, 660 P.2d at 741-42. The Colyer court cited the two leading U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that established U.S. Constitutional protection for a right of privacy:
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right of privacy emanates from the
penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights which protects the use of contraceptives by
married persons); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the fourteenth amendment gives
rise to the right of privacy which protects a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion). Other
Supreme Court rulings on privacy have also attributed its constitutional source to the fourteenth
amendment. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
92. E.g., Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 N.E. 417,
424 (1977) (unwritten constitutional right of privacy encompasses right of incompetent person to refuse
life-sustaining treatment); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (Privacy is "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances.").
93. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 213. See Colver, 99 Wn. 2d at 119-20, 660 P.2d at 742.
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as required by the fourteenth amendment, 95 in (1) the nexus between the
state and prohibitions against foregoing life-sustaining treatment in Wash-
ington's criminal code as well as its licensing requirements for physicians,
(2) the judiciary's participation in the guardianship process, and (3) the
state's parenspatriae responsibility to supervise the affairs of the incompe-
tent. 96 The court also stated that article 1, section 7 of Washington's state
constitution supported a patient's privacy right to refuse treatment. 97
Second, the Colyer court asserted that the common law protection of
freedom of choice with respect to medical treatment included the right of
all terminally ill patients to forego treatment that only prolonged their
dying.98 "Freedom of choice," the court noted, derived from the common
law right of all persons to be free from nonconsensual invasion of bodily
integrity.99
The Colyer court cautioned, however, that whether founded on the
common law or a constitutional right of privacy, the right to refuse
treatment was not absolute.100 Recognizing the state's responsibility to
protect the well-being of its citizens,101 the court identified four "state
interests:" 10 2 (1) preserving life, (2) protecting innocent third parties,
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 120-21,660 P.2d at742, (quoting Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)):
[Privacy], if founded on the federal constitution and applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, extends only to situations where state action exists. . . .The existence of "state
action" for constitutional purposes depends on "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."
96. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 121, 660 P.2d at 742.
97. Id. at 120, 660 P.2d at 742. The court's one reference to art. 1, § 7 was placed at the end of a
discussion dealing with federal constitutional privacy.
98. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 121-22, 660 P.2d at 743. Nowhere did the court expressly define "life-
sustaining treatment;" however, the court did distinguish between life-saving treatment and treatment
that only postponed the moment of death. Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 745.
99. Id. at 122, 660 P.2d at 743.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Courts use the term "state interests" in several ways. Here, Colyer's use of the term "state
interests" is consistent with the pattern ofjudicial approaches in cases involving the refusal of treatment
since the Quinlan decision, see, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417,425 (1977). However, the courts may have employed a misnomer. In cases
involving the rights of terminally ill patients to forego life-sustaining treatment, the interests the court
calls "state interests" do not arise from the need to validate specific state regulations or statutes-as has
been the situation in Supreme Court decisions where the Court has weighed an individual's privacy
right against the interest of the state in regulating, for example, abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
(1973) and narcotics traffic (Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). In Roe v. Wade the Court stated that
an individual's right to privacy is not absolute: "A State may properly assert important interests in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life." 410 U.S. at
154. In cases like Colyer, what the courts have called "state interests" instead seem to describe society's
concerns and values that might be compromised by the assertion of an individual's right to forego
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(3) preventing suicide, and (4) maintaining the integrity of the medical
profession. 03 These state interests are to be balanced, on a case by case
basis, 104 against the patient's right to refuse treatment and the burdens that
the treatment would impose. 105
In applying these criteria, the court found that the state's interest in
preserving Bertha Colyer's life was outweighed by the degree of bodily
invasion occasioned by the treatment required to sustain her life. 106 The
court asserted that the state's interest in preserving life diminished when
continued treatment served only to sustain a life afflicted with a terminal
condition. 107 Next, the court dismissed the state's interest in protecting
innocent third parties, since Bertha Colyer had no minor children and her
family had agreed that life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn. 108
The Colyer court also dismissed the state's interest in preventing suicide,
stating that death following the removal of life-sustaining treatment re-
sulted from natural causes. 10 9 Finally, the court asserted that the state's
medical care. However, to be consistent with courts and commentators on this issue, this Comment
employs the term state interests, though it should be understood the term probably refers to social
interests the courts have said the state has a duty to protect.
103. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 122, 660 P. 2d at 743.
104. Colyer does not expressly state that a patient's right to refuse treatment must be balanced
against these state interests in every case. However, the court did review each interest as it pertained to
the particular circumstances of Bertha Colyer's case. Also, in concluding its review of countervailing
state interests, the court stated: "[T]here were no compelling state interests opposing the removal of life
sustaining mechanisms from Bertha Colyer that outweighed her right to refuse such treatment." Id. at
123, 660 P. 2d at 743.
105. Id. at 122-23,660 P. 2d at 743; accordSeverns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156,
159 (Del. Ch. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.3d 417, 425-26 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647,663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
106. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743. This position rejects the view that life, whatever its
quality, must be preserved at all cost. Many courts, see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text, and
ethicists agree. See, e.g., Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 18: Wanzer, supra note 34, at 955-59.
107. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743; accord Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425; Quinlan,
355 A.2d at 664.
108. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
109. Id. at 123, 660 P.2d at 743 ("A death which occurs after the removal of life sustaining systems
is from natural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the patient.").
Courts confronted with cases presenting the issue of foregoing life-sustaining treatment have
consistently ruled that suicide is not involved even though death follows the termination of care. E.g.,
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11 ("The interest in protecting against suicide seems to require little if
any discussion. . . . What we consider here is a competent, rational decision to refuse treatment when
death is inevitable [from the underlying terminal condition] and the treatment offers no hope of cure or
preservation of life. "); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985) (withdrawing patient's
artificial means of feeding would not constitute attempted suicide, "as the decision would probably be
based on a wish to be free of medical intervention rather than a specific intent to die, and her death would
result, if at all, from her underlying medical condition, which included her inability to swallow").
Suicide is no longer a crime in Washington, although promoting a suicide attempt is a class C felony.
See WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1985). At common law, suicide required the presence of two
elements: (1) the individual set in motion a death producing agent with (2) the specific intent of effecting
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interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession was not at
odds with a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment. 110 Thus, unless the
state can show an overwhelming interest in the protection of innocent third
parties,111 the court's analysis suggests that state interests, as a matter of
law, cannot prevail when the patient asserting the right to forego treatment
is terminally ill.
2. In re Hamlin
In re Hamlin1 12 both modified and extended Colyer. Forty-two year old
Joseph Han-lin, severely retarded since birth, had suffered a cardiopulmon-
ary arrest which left him in a persistent vegetative state. 113 Like Bertha
Colyer, Hamlin had never executed an NDA directive. Unlike Bertha
Colyer, however, Hamlin had never expressed any wishes regarding medi-
cal treatment. The hospital in which he was a patient petitioned the court for
termination of his life support systems. In granting the petitioner's request,
the court authorized the termination of mechanical ventilation and anti-
biotics, and the entry of a "no-code" order in Joseph Hamlin's chart. 114
Hamlin again affirmed that "[a]n incompetent patient does not lose his
right to consent to termination of life supporting care by virtue of his
incompetency." 115 The court reexamined its position with respect to lan-
guage in Colyer which suggested that a guardian would always have to be
appointed for patients who had never been competent. 116 The court also
his or her own destruction. See Byrn, supra note 68, at 16-24 for an excellent discussion of this issue
generally.
110. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
111. Two situations where third party interests might be.considered overwhelming are (1) the
patient's family is economically or emotionally unprepared for the patient's death, and (2) the family's
religious beliefs mandate medical intervention. However, a family's inability to accept a patient's death
should prevail, if at all, only for the period necessary to meet the family's immediate emotional needs.
See, e.g., Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 20-21; Zerwekh, supra note 40, at 50-51. A family's
economic need to keep a patient alive, for example in order to collect employment benefits, presents a
difficult question beyond the scope of this Comment. The issue was addressed, however, by the court in
Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., No. 85E0009-GI, slip op. at 27 (Mass. P. Ct. Oct. 21, 1985). See
generally PREsIDENT's COMM'N, supra note 1, at 95-100; Bym, supra note 68, at 33-34; Cassel, supra
note 4; Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 239.
Modem religious tenets generally do not require that the life of a terminally ill patient be sustained in
all circumstances. See the courts' discussions of this issue in Brophy, slip op. at 26-27; In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 658-60, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See also Supplemental Brief of
Respondent, Harborview Medical Center at 25-27, In re Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984).
112. 102 Wn. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372(1984).
113. Id. at 812-13, 689 P.2d at 1374. See supra note 2 for discussion of persistent vegetative state.
114. 102 Wn. 2dat814, 824,689 P.2dat 1375,1380. Seesupranote7foranexplanationofa "no-
code" (DNR) order.
115. 102 Wn. 2d at 816, 689 P.2d at 1376.
116. Id. at 817, 689 P.2d at 1376-77.
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outlined new procedures for surrogate decisionmaking. In Colyer-type
situations, where the patient has once been competent and a family member
is available to act on the patient's behalf, the decision to forego life-
sustaining treatment can be reached only after the patient's attending
physician has diagnosed the patient to be in a persistent vegetative state
with no reasonable chance of recovery, and life support systems are
maintaining the patient's life. 117 A prognosis board must unanimously
confirm this diagnosis. 118 The decision then devolves upon the patient's
immediate family, which consults with the attending physician and the
prognosis committee. If family members all agree that the patient's best
interests would be advanced by withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, such treatment could be foregone. 119 In evaluating the patient's
best interests, family members are to consider the patient's previously
expressed wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment and his or her general
attitude toward medical care. 120
In Hamlin-type situations, where the patient is incompetent and has no
available family, a guardian must be appointed to represent the patient's
best interests. 121 Then, as in the family situation, if the attending physician,
prognosis committee, and the guardian all agree that the incompetent
patient's best interests are served by foregoing life-sustaining treatment,
the decision can be made to request cessation of such care. 122
117. Id. at 819, 689 P.2d at 1378.
118. Id. at 818-19, 689 P.2d at 1377-78.
119. Id. If there is disagreement among the parties involved in the decisionmaking process, court
intervention is appropriate. Id. at 821, 689 P.2d at 1379.
120. Id. at 816-17, 689 P.2d at 1376. See also Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 131, 660 P.2d at 747.
121. Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d at 819-21, 689 P.2d at 1378.
122. Id. The Hamlin dissent questioned whether surrogate decisionmakers ought to be free from
judicial involvement:
The majority adopts [its] position without exploring the ramifications of its rule or the wisdom of
waiving court intervention. . . . First, the majority's decision to circumvent court-appointed
guardian proceedings negates the safeguards inherent in the guardian statutes and authorizes,
illegally, a person other than the patient to exercise the patient's right to refuse treatment.
Id. at 825, 689 P.2d at 1381 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
See Comment, The Right to Die-A Current Look, 30 LOYOLA L. REV. 139, 177 (1984) (suggesting
that the traditional patient/family/physician relationship remains a viable model for decisionmaking
responsibility). But see Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977) (requiring judicial intervention in every case involving the withholding or withdrawing of life-
sustaining treatment from an incompetent patient). Colyer explicitly rejected the Saikewicz approach.
99 Wn. 2d at 127, 660 P.2d at 745-46. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 653-74 (reviewing the
divergent approaches of different courts; recommending that, at minimum, courts be involved in
appointing a guardian to make the decision).
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B. Analysis: Applying the Principles of Colyer and Hamlin to Artificial
Nutrition and Hydration
In re Colyer and In re Hamlin characterized a broad set of principles
upon which terminally ill patients or their surrogates may assert a right to
forego life-sustaining medical treatment, but neither decision addressed the
emotionally sensitive issue of artificial sustenance. Since artificial nutrition
and hydration was not in controversy in Colyer or Hamlin, Washington
courts may be asked in the future whether artificial nutrition and hydration
are among the treatments patients may refuse. Certainly patients, hospitals,
and attorneys will ask the question. The principles set down in Colyer and
Hamlin indicate that a patient's right to forego life-sustaining treatment is
not dependent on the specific nature of the intervention. Only when
countervailing state interests outweigh a particular patient's right to forego
treatment, will that patient's fundamental rights be circumscribed.
1. The Common Law
In Colyer, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the common law
right to bodily integrity as one source for the right of terminally ill patients
to forego life-sustaining treatment. The law has long recognized individu-
als' interests in preserving the inviolability of their persons.123 In 1891, the
United States Supreme Court, applying this interest to protect the right of a
personal injury plaintiff to refuse a medical examination, stated: "no right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person
... "124 This common law principle eventually found expression in the
judicially created doctrine of informed consent. 125 Under this doctrine,
competent patients who are not terminally ill may refuse surgery or other
medical treatment, even though the treatment is necessary to save the
123. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HIARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
124. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
125. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1633-34 (1974)
(examining the underpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent, beginning with Judge Cardozo's
opinion in Schloendorf v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)). The Note argues
that the doctrine of informed consent includes the right to nontreatment. Both Washington's legislature
and judiciary concur. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wn. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972);
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 7.70.050(3)(d), -. 060(1)(d) (1985).
Informed consent involves three basic prerequisites: (1) the patient must have the capacity to reason
and make judgments; (2) the decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion; and (3) the
patient must have a clear understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis. Wanzer, supra
note 34, at 957. Additionally, the patient must also understand his or her right to make choices about the
type of medical care to be received. Id.
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patient's life. 126 Today, most jurisdictions acknowledge that unauthorized
medical treatment constitutes assault and battery 127 or a basis for claiming
medical malpractice. 128
Historically, a right to forego treatment that sustains a dying patient's life
was never made explicit in the common law.129 Nonetheless this right
follows logically from judicial reliance on the common law to uphold the
individual's right to refuse treatment, even when the probable outcome is
death, and even though the person is not terminally ill. 130 The informed
consent doctrine, however, by definiton applies only to competent per-
sons. 131 As in Hamlin, many terminally ill patients are incompetent and
cannot make informed decisions about their own medical care. Still,
underlying the doctrine of informed consent is the general common law
right of all persons to physical inviolability. 132 Just as this right leads to the
notion that a medical practitioner cannot decide a course of treatment
affecting a person's physical integrity without that person's full understand-
ing and agreement, the right also leads to the notion that a person may be
spared physical intrusion of any kind, whatever the medical consequences.
Artificial nutrition and hydration were not directly at issue in Colyer or
Hamlin, but in both cases the court used broad, unqualified language in
discussing life-sustaining treatment. 133 The court balanced three factors:
the invasive nature of the procedure, the prognosis of the patient, and the
presence of state interests that might outweigh the patient's right to refuse
treatment. 134
Artificial nutrition and hydration are invasive, in the same way that the
Colyer and Hamlin decisions found mechanical ventilation, antibiotics,
126. See, e.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 111. 2d 361,205 N.E.2d 435 (1975) (Jehovah's witness may
refuse blood transfusion even though death may follow such refusal); Petition of Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d
616, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (eighty year-old suffering from gangrene may refuse surgery);
In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 2d 619 (C.P., Northampton County Ct. 1973) (sixty year-old resident of
state nursing home may refuse cancer surgery).
127. E.g., Physicians' and Dentists' Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wn. 2d 38, I1l P.2d 568 (1941) (an
unauthorized operation constitutes an assault and battery). See also Note, supra note 125, at 1635-36.
128. Note, supra note 125, at 1635-36. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.030(3) (1985).
129. This is not surprising given the recent nature of the development of life-sustaining treatment.
See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 1.
130. E.g., In re Brooks' Estate, 32 111. 2d 361, 205 N.E. 2d 435. See generally Byrn, supra note 68,
at 3-16.
131. Wanzer, supra note 34, at 955.
132. Note, supra note 125, at 1633-34.
133. For example, in Colyer, the following language was used: "life support systems," 99 Wn. 2d
at 117 and 660 P.2d at 740; "life sustaining mechanisms," id. at 123, 660 P.2d at 743; "life sustaining
treatment," id. at 125, 660 P.2d at 745. In Hamlin, similar language was used: "life support systems,"
102 Wn. 2d 810, 812, 689 P.2d 1372, 1374; "life sustaining treatment," id. at 814, 818, 689 P.2d at
1375, 1377.
134. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 122-23, 660 P.2d at 743.
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and cardiopulmonary resuscitation to be invasive. 135 They only postpone
inevitable death in the terminally ill. While Colyer would require that state
interests be balanced against the patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration, these interests will rarely prevail. 136 Therefore, by extension
of the Colyer court's analysis, a terminally ill patient's right to forego
artificial nutrition and hydration falls within the area of medical decision-
making protected by the common law. 137
2. Washington's State Constitution
Opponents not only of the right to forego artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion, but also of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in general,
demand that the common law foundation for these rights be overturned.
Washington lawmakers, however, should not disregard this state's strong
tradition favoring individual autonomy, 138 especially in light of the sub-
ject's constitutional overtones.
A constitutional right to privacy in medical care decisionmaking embod-
ies many of the same values protected by the common law: the sanctity of
individual freedom of choice, self-determination, personal autonomy, and
human dignity. 139 The Colyer court held that article 1, section 7 of the
Washington constitution supported its holding that an incurable, terminally
ill adult had a right of privacy that encompassed the right to forego life-
sustaining treatment. 140 This provision states: "No person shall be
135. See supra notes 36-56, 67 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. See also Byrn, supra note 68, at 16-36.
137. Countervailing state interests also can impact a patient's right to refuse treatment when that
right is premised on a constitutional right of privacy. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
See also infra notes 170-93 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PuGEr SouND L. REv. 491 (1984).
139. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d
417,424 (1977) ("Of even broader import [than the common law interest of the individual in being free
from non-consensual invasion of his bodily integrity], but arising from the same regard for human
dignity and self-determination, is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy. . ."); Cantor, supra
note 4, at 559 ("whether a patient's prerogative to spurn life-preserving treatment is grounded on
constitutional privacy or on the common-law doctrine of informed consent, the object remains to
promote individual dignity by honoring self-determination and choice.").
140. In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114,120,660 P.2d738, 742 (1983). In three otherjurisdictions courts
have recognized that provisions in their state constitutions protected an individual's right to privacy
which included the right to forego medical treatment. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d
186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984)(holding that the explicit mention of privacy in California Const.
art. 1, sec. I protected the right of a terminally ill adult to refuse medical treatment required to sustain
that person's life): In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93, 95 (1980) (recognizing that under New
Hampshire's constitution, individuals have a right of privacy that may be asserted to prevent unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity);In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647,663 (1976) (while the court
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disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." 141
Unlike the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, 142 article 1,
section 7 of Washington's Declaration of Rights of the state constitution
explicitly addresses privacy. Although traditionally Washington courts
have associated this constitutional provision with fourth amendment guar-
antees against unreasonable search and seizure, 143 constitutional history
and textual analysis indicate that the framers of the Washington document
sought protection different from that guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 144
While convention delegates considered the text of the fourth amendment,
they chose instead the language "private affairs." 145 Despite the pre-Colyer
absence of specific applications of article 1, section 7 to cases not involving
search and seizure, state courts have spoken generally of privacy outside
ultimately relied on the U.S. Constitution as the basis for a right of privacy that encompassed an
individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the court did note that such right of privacy is
found in the New Jersey Constitution at art. 1, 1).
141. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
142. The Bill of Rights by its terms and necessary implications has been viewed only to limit the
freedom of government when dealing with individuals. Glennon & Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221.
143. E.g., State v. Myrick, 102 Wn. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984); State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92,
640 P. 2d 1061 (1982). See also, Comment, The Origin and Development ofWashington's Independent
Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV.
459 (1986).
144. Utter, supra note 138, at 496-99. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that state constitutions may be more protective of
individual rights than their federal counterparts. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 n.4 (1975). See also Utter, supra note 138, at 493.
With increasing frequency, Washington courts have accepted this challenge, often when applying art. 1,
§ 7. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (art. 1, § 7, unlike the fourth
amendment, prohibited a police officer's warrantless entry into the residence of a person he had just
arrested for a misdemeanor unless the officer possessed certain facts); State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686,
674 P. 2d 1240 (1983) (art. 1, § 7 limits warrantless searches incident to arrest to areas within the arrested
person's immediate control). See generally Utter, supra note 138, at n.4 and accompanying text.
Historically, state courts have not looked to individual rights' guarantees in their state constitutions.
See Comment, supra note 143. Yet this situation is changing. Recent writings by Justices Utter and
Linde of the Washington and Oregon Supreme Courts, respectively, and Justice Brennan of the United
States Supreme Court, note an emerging trend among state courts to construe as more protective state
constitutional counterparts of Bill of Rights provisions. The justices urge greater reliance on state
constitutional provisions in the future. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State's Bill ofRights,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Utter, supra note 138.
145. See supra text accompanying note 141; JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION: 1889 at 497 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962), noted in State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d
1061, 1071 (1982).
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the search and seizure context. 146 In a recent holding, the Washington
Supreme Court observed that the court should use the common law in force
at the time of the constitution's enactment to aid it in construing specific
constitutional provisions. 147 When the Washington state Constitutional
Convention convened in 1889, the right of the individual "to be let alone"
had long been recognized at common law. 148
The Washington Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the state constitu-
tion, and fully aware of the state's common law history, has stated that
terminally ill patients in hospitals and nursing homes have a reasonable
expectation of privacy under article 1, section 7-privacy that protects
their right to refuse treatment that only postpones their death. Further,
because assertions of privacy under article 1, section 7 do not require a
showing of state action as does an assertion of privacy under the federal
constitution, 149 all patients in Washington, not just those in state-owned
facilities, are guaranteed their rights to forego life-sustaining treatment.
Focusing on the rights to privacy and bodily integrity rather than the fine
distinctions between artificial nutrition and hydration and other medical
treatments highlights the constitutional irrelevance of those distinctions. 150
146. In State v. Meacham, 93 Wn. 2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980), the court discussed a constitu-
tional right to privacy in the context of a challenge to Washington's Uniform Parentage Act on the
grounds that the Act's mandatory blood test violated an individual's right to personal privacy. Although
the Meacham court held that the state's interest in protecting minors prevailed over the challenger's
constitutional right to privacy, the court agreed that such a right existed. Id. at 737-38, 612 P.2d at
797-98. The court, however, did not indicate whether it was refering to the state or federal constitution.
In Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn. 2d 275,517 P.2d 911 (1974), the court addressed a political candidate's right
to privacy regarding his financial affairs. The court concluded, however, that as long as there was no
intrusion upon intimate personal matters, the public's right to know would prevail. Id. at 298, 517P.2d
at 923. Again, the court did not associate the right of privacy with any particular constitution.
147. State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983); Note, New Limits on Police Vehicle
Searches in Washington, 60 WASH. L. REv. 177, 179 (1984). The Ringer court construed WASH. CONST.
art. 27, § 2, which provides that "[a]ll laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are not
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitation," as
adopting the then current common law. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d at 690-91, 694 P.2d at 1293.
148. See generally Comment, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARv. L.
Rav. 1892 (1981); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 123.
149. In Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wn. 2d 230,635 P.2d 108 (1981), the
Washington Supreme Court held that in contrast to the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution, See
supra note 95. Washington's art. 1, § 5 protected the exercise of free speech rights even in the absence of
state action. The court in Colyer also implied that if privacy is founded on the state constitution, a
showing of state action is not required. On its face, the language of art. 1, § 7 does not require state
action.
150. See G. ANNAS & L. GLANz, WrrHHoLDiNG AND WrrHDRAwING OF Lie-SusTAIMINO TREAT-
MENTS FOR ELDERLY INcoMPETENT PATIENTS: A REVIEW OF CouRT DECIsIONS AND LEoIsLATvE AP-
PROACHES, PREPARED FOR THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 5
(Dec. 24, 1985) which stated:
We think it is especially important to note that we do not distinguish between various forms of
medical treatment on the basis of their utility, side effects, number of moving parts, novelty,
Washington Law Review
If the Washington Supreme Court were to review the constitutionality of
a statute purporting to limit a patient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and
hydration, the court, interpreting such a statute in light of article 1, section
7, would be compelled to strike down the statute. Similarly, were a court
asked to enjoin a hospital or nursing home from force-feeding a patient, the
court would grant the injunction because the right to forego artificial
nutrition and hydration is protected by Washington's constitution. Both
Colyer and Hamlin held that article 1, section 7 supports the privacy right
of terminally ill adults to forego invasive medical care that merely prolongs
their dying.
3. The Federal Constitution
Colyer relied heavily upon a federal constitutional right of privacy as one
source for the right of terminally ill patients to forego life-sustaining
treatment.151 Courts of New Jersey, 152 Massachusetts, 153 Delaware, 154
Florida, 155 and Ohio 156 also have asserted that a right to privacy under the
United States Constitution secures to the individual "independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions"157 free from government
interference, 158 which includes medical decisions even though the outcome
may be death.
Privacy, however, is not a right enumerated in the federal constitution. 159
While the Supreme Court has recognized a right of privacy in the context of
marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, and family relation-
ships, 160 the Court has not considered whether this right protects a
expense or on other grounds. Such a distinctions [sic] tend to . . . detract from focusing on the
individual patient, and his rights and welfare.
See also Seattle Times, Jan. 8, 1986, at 8, col. 1 (guidelines recently approved by Los Angeles medical
and legal associations acknowledged that artificial nutrition and hydration are legally equivalent to
other forms of life-sustaining treatments patients have a right to forego).
151. See In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 119-21, 660 P.2d 740, 741-42 (1983).
152. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); accord In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
153. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977); accordln re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct.
466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
154. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. Ch. 1980).
155. Satz v. Permutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980);
accord John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
156. Leach v. Akron Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
157. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
158. Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REv. 777, 785-93 (1980).
159. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Utter, supra note 138, at
495.
160. E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (restriction on government's ability to collect data
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terminally ill patient's decision to forego life-sustaining treatment. The
Supreme Court has refused to extend privacy to decisionmaking in some
seemingly personal matters, such as homosexual conduct. 161 Since termi-
nal illness is a medical matter as is pregnancy, a greater similarity appears
between a patient's right to refuse intrusive medical care and a woman's
protected right to abortion than between unrecognized rights to sexual
freedom and rights to nontreatment. Still, the Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue of extending the privacy concept to a patient's decision
about life-sustaining treatment.
Basing the right of foregoing life-sustaining treatment on a federal
constitutional right of privacy, however, presents a limitation. The four-
teenth amendment requires finding a basis for state action. 162 While most
courts applying a federally based privacy right to decisions involving
foregoing medical treatment have not addressed the issue, Washington
expressly confronted the problem in Colyer. 163 The Colyer court found state
action in the combined presence of the state's ability to impose criminal
sanctions on the hospital and its staff, the licensing of physicians, the
required involvement of the judiciary in the process of guardianship ap-
pointment, and the state's parens patriae1 64 responsibility to supervise the
affairs of incompetents.
The four grounds relied upon by the court, however, may not always be
present together, and the court did not indicate whether any one or another
combination of factors would be sufficient. First, Colyer itself eliminated
the threat of criminal sanctions, since it held that good faith compliance
concerning individual citizens); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's decision whether or not to
have an abortion); accordDoe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438(1972)
(unmarried persons' use of contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of
obscene materials in the home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married persons' use of
contraceptives). See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsrrrtroNAL LAW 734-65 (2d
ed. 1984). But see Enslin v. Bean, 436 U.S. 912 (1978) (Court refused to review sodomy conviction of
an adult who had engaged in private, consensual homosexual act with another adult).
161. Enslin, 436 U.S. 912 (homosexual conduct between two consenting adults); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (the Court recognized that privacy places some restriction on the goverment's
ability to collect data about individual citizens, however, the Court upheld state law requiring
physicians and pharmacies to foward to state authorities copies of narcotics prescriptions); Lovisi v.
Slaton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Lovisi v.
Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (heterosexual conduct when third persons are watching or participat-
ing).
162. See supra note 142.
163. In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). "This privacy right [to forego life-
sustaining treatment], if founded on the federal constitution and applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, extends only to situations where state action exists." Id. at 120-21, 660 P.2d at
742 (emphasis added).
164. Parens patriae refers to the state's authority, exerciseable through its courts, to protect
individuals who cannot adequately defend their own interests. PRsMIDENT's COMM'N, supra note 1, at
39.
Washington Law Review
with a proscribed decisionmaking procedure would not be criminal. 165
Second, the later opinion, Hamlin, removed routine participation of the
Washington judiciary in foregoing treatment decisions, since competent
patients may always exercise their own choices free of court involvement,
and a guardian need not be appointed for an incompetent patient if a family
member can intervene on the patient's behalf. 16 6 Third, since Hamlin
indicated that the court need not be involved in routine decisions for
incompetent patients in the absence of disagreement among family mem-
bers and health care personnel, 167 the state's parenspatriae authority would
not be invoked. Finally, though the state's regulation and licensing of health
care facilities and personnel remain candidates for finding state action, it is
unclear whether these factors alone are sufficient. 168 Thus a patient's
opportunity to exercise a federal constitutional privacy right may be limited
to situations where state action could otherwise be found, such as residence
in a state-owned health care facility. 169
4. State Interests
Colyer held that a patient's right to forego life-sustaining treatment is not
absolute, but must be balanced against four countervailing state interests:
(1) the preservation of life; (2) the prevention of suicide; (3) maintaining the
integrity of the medical profession, and (4) the protection of third party
interests. 170 While language in Colyer implies that these interests must be
weighed against the patient's decision to forego treatment on a case by case
basis, 171 the court's evaluation of these interests, as applied to Bertha
165. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 138, 660 P.2d at 751.
166. In re Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d 810, 818-19, 689 P.2d 1372, 1337 (1984).
167. Id. at 820-21, 689 P.2d at 1378.
168. For example, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In Blum, nursing home patients
attempted unsuccessfully to argue that private operation of a nursing home involved a symbiotic
relationship between the state and the home, based on heavy state subsidies, licensing of the facilities,
and government-paid medical expenses. The Court, however, held that despite the extensive state
regulation to which the nursing home was subject, that alone was not enough to constitute state action.
See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that the extensive licensing
and regulation of a public utility did not involve sufficient state action to subject the utility to
constitutional restraint). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 160, at 514-16.
169. Actions of any governmental entity give rise to state action for the purposes of constitutional
limitations. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 160, at 498. Compare Cantor, supra note 4,
at 547. Cantor notes that there are advantages to viewing a patient's right to forego treatment as
grounded on the common law as opposed to the federal constitution: the patients do not have to worry
about establishing state action because their claims are as enforceable against a private hospital or
practitioner as they are against a government-sponsored institution subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment.
170. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Colyer, suggests that state interests will rarely prevail when the patient is
incurably, terminally ill and the treatment in question serves only to
postpone death.172 Although artificial nutrition and hydration treatments
were not before the Colyer court, a review of state interests with regard to
artificial sustenance does not support a contrary result.
Most courts, including Colyer, have determined that the preservation of
life is the most significant state interest. 173 The sanctity of life is a funda-
mental value in our society, and the state's responsibility to its citizens
includes protecting their health and welfare. The Washington Supreme
Court in Colyer recognized, however, that the state's interest in preserving
life and protecting individual welfare does not require that all lives be
sustained in all circumstances. 174 The state cannot insist on preserving
patients' health against their wishes. Society values, to a greater extent, the
right of individual choice. 175
The Colyer court asserted that where the treatment merely prolongs the
dying process, the balancing of the state's interest in preserving life against
the patient's right to refuse treatment should include an evaluation of
treatment invasiveness. 176 Artificial nutrition and hydration present such a
context: the treatments cannot treat or cure a terminal condition; artificial
sustenance can only prolong the dying process. Each method of artificial
nutrition and hydration is physically and emotionally invasive. 177 A patient
bound by physical restraints to prevent dislodging the tube or needle would
lose any remaining personal freedom and dignity. In cases of terminal
illness, the state's interest is merely in preserving life for a limited time, not
in preserving a productive, satisfying life that would otherwise be lost.
The state's interest in preventing suicide has also led occasionally to
court-ordered medical treatment, including, in some jurisdictions, court-
172. See supra note 104.
173. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743. See also In re President & Directors of Georgetown
College, 331 E2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (treatment compelled on basis of state's interest in preserving life
where patient had good chance of recovery), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) ; Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
174. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 122, 660.P.2d at 743 (1983).
175. See Cantor, supra note 4, at 556. For example, the state cannot stop people from smoking,
mandate low cholesterol diets, or require everyone to get 20 minutes of exercise a day in order to
preserve health.
176. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743 (1983).
177. InreConroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486A.2d 1209, 1247-50(1985) (Handler, L, concurringinpartand
dissenting in part). Cantor, supra note 4, states:
[P]atients care about and may suffer embarassment and frustration from diminished intellectual
functioning, frustration and helplessness from being dependent on others for every aspect of
bodily functioning, humiliation from being viewed in a grossly debilitated state, rage at being
physically restrained from removing life-sustaining equipment, or emotional pain from sensing a
burden upon surrounding loved ones.
Id. at 565-66.
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ordered artificial nutrition and hydration. Generally, these cases of forced
feeding involved nonterminal persons who were healthy except for their
self-imposed starvation. 178 Where a patient is terminally ill, Washington's
legislature and its judiciary have stated that death following the withhold-
ing or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment is not attributable to the act
or omission of foregoing medical care. 179 Death is said to result from the
patient's underlying terminal condition. 180 Preventing suicide, therefore,
would not be a consideration weighing against a terminally ill patient's
decision to forego artificial sustenance.
Next, the Colyer court concluded that the state's interest in maintaining
the integrity of the medical profession is not compromised when terminally
ill patients choose to forego life-sustaining treatment. 181 This result should
not be affected when the treatment is artificial nutrition and hydration.
Current medical ethics and practice do not obligate health care practi-
tioners to provide futile care, 182 and there is widespread consensus that
where the burdens of a particular treatment, including artificial nutrition
and hydration, outweigh the benefits, the patient may be better served by
not being provided such care.18 3 Where the court, the legislature, the
patient, or the family support the determination to withhold or withdraw
treatment, the medical profession's integrity should remain intact. 184
178. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hosp., No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Riverside filed Dec.
16, 1983), citedin L.A. Daily J., Dec. 23, 1983, at 14, col. 5. Ms. Bouvia suffered from cerebral palsy, a
nonprogressive, nonterminal muscular disorder which left her quadriplegic. Note, Suicide, Eu-
thanasia, Murder: The Line Blurs, supra note 30, at 413 n.4. She had checked herself into the hospital
where she requested the court to enjoin the hospital from force-feeding her. Cox, Disabled Woman's
Request to Die Raises Legal Furor, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 6. The court refused to grant
Ms. Bouvia's request.
See also In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226,480 A.2d 93 (1984), where the New Hampshire Supreme Court
refused to permit a prison inmate to intentionally starve himself to death. The court held that since the
prisoner was not facing death from illness, but rather was setting in motion the death-producing agent,
the state's interest in preserving its criminal justice system and in preserving life would prevail to
compel artificial nutrition and hydration. Id. at 96-97.
179. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743; WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.050.
180. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; infra note 200 and accompanying text; see also
Cantor, supra note 4, at 549. Society's anti-suicide policy is directed principally at preventing disturbed
individuals from rashly destroying themselves, a policy having little relevance to patients faced with an
inevitable dying process. Id.
181. Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
182. Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 18-21.
183. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (1983); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 90; Lynn &
Childress, supra note 33, at 18-19; Wanzer, supra note 34, at 958-59. Compare Callahan, supra note 10
(despite the moral licitness of discontinuing feeding under some circumstances, there are worthy
emotions that may be repelled by the idea of starving someone to death, even in those cases where it
might be for the patient's own good).
184. Amundsen, The Physicians' Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty without Classical
Roots, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 27 (1978) (contrary to popular belief, the Hippocratic Oath
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Some authorities argue, however, that administering artificial nutrition
and hydration fulfills the need of health practioners to actively intervene in
patient care and to postpone death. 185 But health practitioners can posi-
tively promote a terminally ill patient's welfare in other ways than by
managing artificial nutrition and hydration. 186 The personal values of
health professionals who are morally offended by decisions to forego
artificial sustenance should not interfere with the right of patients or their
surrogates to make these decisions when prevailing medical ethics do not
demand that life be prolonged in all circumstances. 187
In some instances, the state's interest in protecting third parties, particu-
larly other family members, has prevailed to require medical intervention.
When treatment has been compelled on this basis, typically the patient was
not terminally ill, 188 the patient had dependent children, 189 the treatment
was expected to restore the patient's health, 190 or the treatment was not
contains no duty to prolong a life inflicted with a terminal condition); Byrn, supra note 68, at 29-33
(while neither the doctor nor the hospital is required to undertake a course of treatment contrary to good
medical judgment, "[tihe rule of the supremacy of the 'doctor's conscience' finds no real support in
law"); Wanzer, supra note 34, at 958 (equating a patient's appropriate level of medical care should vary
with the patient's condition and prognosis).
185. See Micetich, Steinecker &Thomasma, supra note 67, at 975, 977; Wanzer, supra note 34, at
956. But see the recently announced opinion of the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs which states, "[tihe social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice of the patient, or his
family or legal representative if the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf, should prevail."
Memorandum from the American Medical Ass'n to FEDNET (Mar. 17, 1986) (discussing life-
prolonging treatment) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
186. Withholding life-sustaining treatment does not mean withholding care. "Supportive care
should be appropriately 'aggressive,' with adequate pain control, attention to bladder and bowel
function, discontinuance of 'routine' tests, unlimited visiting hours, opportunities to talk or be silent,
and assistance in arranging personal affairs." Lo & Jonsen, Clinical Decisions to Limit Treatment, 93
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 764, 767 (1980). See also PREsImENT's COMM'N,supra note 1, at 89-90;
Wanzer, supra note 34, at 958-59.
187. Byrn, supra note 68, at 29-33. See also Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 20 (withholding
or withdrawing artificial sustenance may even be morally obligatory when a patient has made it clear
such intervention is unwanted).
188. E.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255,399 N.E.2d 452 (1979) (court
ordered hemodialysis of prison inmate, who, though he depended on the treatment to cleanse his blood,
was not terminally ill; court was concerned with the state's interest in upholding orderly prison
administration).
189. E.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (court
ordered a life-saving blood transfusion for mother of seven month old child after mother refused, on
religious grounds, in face of life-threatening ruptured ulcer), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
Compare In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (court refused to order transfusion for father of two
children); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 111. 2d 361,205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (court refused to order transfusion
for mother of adult children when mother refused blood.transfusion necessary to treat peptic ulcer).
190. E.g., United States v. George, 239 F Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (blood transfusion ordered
for patient with bleeding ulcer from which he was expected to recover); Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000. But see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 644, 38 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (court ordered
blood transfusion for terminally ill, profoundly retarded cancer patient).
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especially invasive. 19 1 Conversely, in decisions involving artificial nutri-
tion and hydration and the terminally ill, the restoration of health is not a
factor. Though the state's interest in protecting the spiritual and material
well-being of dependent children might have significance if the parent
could recover, little benefit accrues to children whose terminally ill parent
is artificially maintained by feeding tubes and hydration lines in a health
care institution. Indeed, the emotional and financial burdens imposed by
court-ordered medical treatment may harm a child's interest. 192
Countervailing state interests do not mandate the provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration to all terminally ill patients. Good medical practice
and humanitarian concerns, as well as the principles of Colyer, require a
case by case consideration of the best interests and rights of the individ-
ual. 193 While a court must weigh state interests against a terminally ill
patient's fundamental right to refuse treatment, in practice, these interests
will rarely generate an outcome contrary to a patient's or surrogate's
choice. Society's notions of human dignity and respect for the individual
are too fundamental. The question that should be weighed on a case by case
basis is the value of the treatment to the patients themselves. 194
III. STATUTORY BASIS FOR FOREGOING ARTIFICIAL
NUTRITION AND HYDRATION: WASHINGTON'S NATURAL
DEATH ACT
A. The Act
In 1979, finding that modern medical technology had made possible the
artificial prolongation of life beyond natural limits, and understanding that
many people are incompetent at the time of terminal illness and cannot
make decisions about their medical care, 195 Washington's legislature en-
acted the Natural Death Act (NDA). 196 This Act specifically addresses the
right of terminally ill patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 197 It
191. E.g., State v. Meacham, 93 Wn. 2d 735, 738, 612 P.2d 795, 797 (1980) (on grounds of
promoting minor child's interest, court upheld statutorily required blood test for purpose of determining
child's paternity since pain inflicted by blood withdrawal is inconsequential and "any hazard to health is
virtually nonexistent").
192. See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
vs. the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 251-54 (1973).
193. See In re Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d 810, 815, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375 (1984); Cantor, supra note 4, at
570-76.
194. See infra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (1985).
196. Id. §§ 70.122.010-.905.
197. Id. §§ 70.122.030, -. 060. The term "procedures" rather than "treatment" is used in the
NDA. The difference in meaning is not significant and the terms are frequently used interchangeably.
See supra note 133. Senate Bill 3228 would amend Washington's NDA to change "procedures" to
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authorizes health care practitioners to withhold and withdraw life-sustain-
ing procedures from an incompetent, terminally ill patient, 198 if that patient
had, when competent, executed a written directive to that effect. 199 The
NDA defines a "life-sustaining procedure" as "any medical or surgical
"treatment." See supra note 17.
198. The NDA only applies to patients in a "terminal condition." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.122.020-.905 (1985). "Terminal condition" is defined as an "incurable condition caused by
injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining
procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient." Id. § 70.122.020(7) (emphasis
added). The emphasized language is problematic. See, e.g., Uniform Commissioners' Comments to § 1
of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally IIl Act ("Strictly speaking, if death is 'imminent' even with the
full application of life-sustaining treatment, there is little point in having a statute permitting withdrawal
of such procedures.").
199. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.030 (1985) provides that apatient's written directive, commonly
called a living will, shall be signed by the declarer in the presence of two disinterested witnesses who
know the declarer and who believe the declarer to be "of sound mind." Living wills have not been tested
in Washington courts, and some health care institutions refuse to honor them. (Telephone conversation
with Yong 0. Hall, State Long Term Care Ombudsman, Department of Social & Health Services, Jan.
24, 1986.) Still, language in Colyer suggests their enforceability. See In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 118,
660 P.2d 738,741 (1983) ("When [an NDA] directive has been signed, the course is set: the directive is
to be effectuated in good faith. . . and no civil or criminal liability attaches."). However, Washing-
ton's NDA contains no provisions concerning a health care provider's liability for refusing to effectuate
a patient's directive. Some other states' living will statutes do mandate penalties for a health prac-
tioner's failure to comply. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 12-36-107(3)(b) and 12-36-117(l)(s) (provid-
ing that a physician's refusal to comply with a patient's declaration constitutes "unprofessional
conduct" for which his or her license to practice medicine may be revoked).
WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.030(1) (1985) provides in relevant part:
The directive shall be essentially in the following form, but in addition may include other specific
directions:
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
Directive made this day of (month, year).
I , being of sound mind, wilfully, and voluntarily make known my desire that my life
shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, and do hereby declare that:
(a) If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified to be a terminal
condition by two physicians, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve
only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my physician determines that my
death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
(b) In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-sustaining
procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be honored by my family and physician(s) as
the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and I accept the
consequences from such refusal.
(c) If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my physician, this
directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy.
(d) I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and mentally competent to
make this directive.
Signed
City, County, and State of Residence
The declarer has been personally known to me and I believe him or her to be of sound mind.
Witness
Witness
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procedure or intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial
means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which . . . pro-
long[s] the moment of death. ", 200 The Act explicitly excludes medication
and procedures to alleviate pain, but it prohibits no other specific medical
intervention. 20 1 The NDA also provides that health care practitioners' good
faith compliance with a properly executed directive will preclude civil and
criminal liability for the resulting death. 202 Additionally, the patient's cause
of death is to be attributed to his or her underlying terminal condition.203
B. Analysis: The Applicability of the NDA to Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration
Washington's NDA protects the right of a terminally ill patient, who has
properly executed a written directive, to forego artificial nutrition and
hydration. By the plain language of the statutory definition of life-sustain-
ing procedures, the Act does not exclude methods of artificial nutrition and
hydration when these measures serve only to postpone the moment of
death. 2°4 Hydration lines and feeding tubes supplant the vital function of
voluntary ingestion absent in some terminally ill patients, 205 and they do
not treat or cure the patient's underlying terminal condition. Artificial
nutrition and hydration are also not among the procedures the NDA
explicitly excludes. 206 Thus the text of the NDA on its face and by its own
definitions permits the withholding and withdrawing of artificial nutrition
and hydration from a terminally ill patient who has directed the foregoing
of life-sustaining procedures, at least if such intervention is not needed to
mitigate pain. 207
200. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.020(4) (1985).
201. Id. § 70.122.020(4).
202. Id. § 70.122.050.
203. Id. § 70.122.080.
204. Under Washington law, words are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning; if the language
used in a statute is unambiguous, departure from its plain meaning is not justified by policy considera-
tions. State ex rel. Edwards v. Heimann, 633 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980).
205. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985).
206. The maxim expressio inius est exclusio alterius provides that the enumeration of exclusions
from the operation of a statute indicates that the statute should apply to all cases not explicitly excluded.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (Sands 4th ed. 1984). Thus, the
NDA's specific mention of one exception to what constitutes a life-sustaining procedure creates the
inference that all other forms of medical intervention can be included.
207. Because the NDA states that procedures necessary for the alleviation of pain are not life-
sustaining procedures, one could argue that if artificial nutrition and hydration are needed for patient
comfort, they cannot be withheld or withdrawn. Some states' natural death acts specifically address this
contingency. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
§ 5(c) provides that "[tihis [Act] does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other
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Though the legislature originally may not have considered the particular
application of the statute to artificial nutrition and hydration, this does not
preclude coverage of those procedures. 208 Since the legislature cannot
specifically address every circumstance under an act such as the NDA, the
statute's stated purpose serves as an important guide to new questions.
209
The NDA's purpose was to recognize the common law right of adult
persons to make decisions regarding the use of modem medical technology
that prolongs life beyond its natural limits, 210 and the right of individuals to
maintain personal dignity and avoid unnecessary pain and suffering.
211
Construing the Act's coverage to include artificial nutrition and hydration
is consistent with this recognition. 212
Additionally, the legislature stated that patients have a right to pri-
vacy,213 which is consistent with the state constitution's privacy provi-
sion.214 To the extent that a terminally ill patient's right to forego artificial
nutrition and hydration is encompassed by these rights, it will be covered
by the statute.215 Considering the fundamental rights to forego medical
treatment identified by the supreme court in Colyer and Hamlin, the
legislature should not amend the NDA to foreclose its use as a means to
refuse artificial nutrition and hydration.
C. Problems and Solutions
Some patients executing the standard NDA directive may not have
thought of the artificial provision of fluids and nutrients as life-sustaining
procedures. Uncertainty about a patient's intent regarding artificial nutri-
tion and hydration can be alleviated by encouraging individuals to specifi-
cally address this in their directives.216 Patient variability mandates that
decisions to forego life-sustaining procedures, even when authorized by a
health-care provider to provide treatment, including nutrition and hydration, for comfort care or the
alleviation of pain."
208. J. SuTHERLAND, supra note 206, at § 45.09.
209. Id.
210. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.010 (1985).
211. Id.
212. Id. But see PREsmENT's COMM'N, supra note 1, at 145 ("[I]t is hard to place great reliance on
preexisting common law rights, since had the common law established such rights there would have
been no real need for the statutes.").
213. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.010 (1985).
214. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
215. Statutes wil be presumed constitutional. L SurHERLAND, supra note 206, at § 45.11. Even
when a statute is subject to various interpretations, courts will adopt the construction consistent with
legislative purpose. Id.
216. The NDA contains only suggested language for a patient's directive. See supra note 199. A
person's ability to modify the NDA's suggested language was affirmed by the Washington Supreme
Court in DiNino v. State, 102 Wn. 2d 327, 684 P.2d 1297 (1984).
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standard NDA directive, be made in consideration of a patient's individual
circumstances. 217 In the absence of special direction, health care providers
charged with effectuating a patient's general directive first should deter-
mine whether specific evidence indicating a patient's decision to accept
artificial sustenance exists elsewhere. 218 Where specific reference to feed-
ing tubes and hydration lines cannot be found, the patient's general attitude
regarding life-sustaining treatment, demonstrable from standard NDA
language, 219 is evidence that the patient intended that artificial nutrition and
hydration should be withheld or withdrawn.
Despite the uncertainty caused by the NDA's omission of artificial
nutrition and hydration from the statutory definition of "life-sustaining
procedures," the legislature should not amend the definition to specifically
deal with artificial sustenance. Express inclusion of these procedures might
raise questions about other treatments. 220 Additionally, a complete stat-
utory enumeration of life-sustaining procedures could not keep pace with
changes in medical technology.
Washington's NDA permits competent patients to consent to future
nontreatment by allowing such persons to execute a legally effective
written directive that authorizes the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment
in the event of terminal illness or injury. The majority of terminally ill
patients, however, either never execute a directive, 22' or have always been
incompetent. 222 The NDA cannot be invoked to authorize decisions to
forego life-sustaining treatment for these people. But, as the court held in
Colyer and Hamlin, the right to forego life-sustaining treatment extends to
all patients, whether or not a directive has been signed. A written directive
217. See supra text accompanying note 193. However, despite the fact that in executing an NDA
directive a patient may not have considered a wide variety of potential illnesses and treatments, respect
for patient autonomy requires that every effort be made to discern and fulfill the patient's preferences as
previously communicated. See Cantor, supra note 4, at 559-60.
218. For example, health care personnel would determine whether the patient had ever specifically
discussed artificial nutrition and hydration with other health care providers or with family. See
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 132-34; Cantor, supra note 4, at 555. In the case of implement-
ing a patient's directive, the patient's physician also becomes a surrogate decisionmaker insofar as he or
she is charged with determining that the patient is terminally ill. The Colyer court recommended that
when specific direction is absent, surrogate decisionmakers should consider an incompetent patient's
character and personality, statements made prior to becoming ill, and the patient's general attitude
toward medical care. In re Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d 114, 131,660 P.2d 738,747 (1983). See also Cantor, supra
note 4, at 555, 559.
219. See WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.030(1) (1985), supra note 196 and accompanying text.
220. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 206, at § 47.17-.26.
221. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 136-45. People may fail to execute a directive for
many reasons: ignorance of its existence, inattention to its significance, uncertainty about how to
execute one, or failure to foresee the kind of medical circumstances that in fact develop. Id. at 144.
222. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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complying with Washington's NDA is but one means for persons to express
a future choice.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION: GUIDELINES
FOR SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING
In Hamlin, the court outlined procedural guidelines for surrogate deci-
sionmaking. Initially, a prognosis board must unanimously approve the
attending physician's finding that the patient is incurably ill.2 23 Then the
surrogate must use his or her own best judgment to assert the rights and best
interests of the incompetent person. 224 But beyond stating in Colyer that the
surrogate's decision be one the patient would have made if competent, the
court offered little substantive guidance for the decisionmaking process. To
fill this gap, Washington should adopt a modified version of the approach
recently taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of In re
Conroy.225
First, the New Jersey court described a "subjective test" whereby life-
sustaining treatment could be foregone "when it is clear that the particular
patient would have refused the treatment under the circumstances in-
volved." ' 226 The surrogate must have both convincing evidence of the
patient's desire not to have life-sustaining intervention 227 and medical
information equivalent to that which a competent patient would have had
before consenting to or rejecting treatment.228 This approach promotes a
patient's common law and constitutional right of personal choice. It also
appropriately incorporates the traditional reliance of health care decision-
making on the doctrine of informed consent.229
The New Jersey court then outlined two "best interests" tests to promote
the welfare of terminally ill patients who never clearly expressed their
desires, and thus for whom the subjective test cannot be used. 230 Under the
first "best interest" test, if there is some evidence that the patient would
have refused treatment, and it is clear to the surrogate decisionmaker that
223. Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d at 819, 689 P.2d at 1378. According to Colyer, a prognosis board should
consist of no fewer than two physicians with qualifications relevant to the patient's condition, plus the
attending physician. Colyer, 99 Wn. 2d at 135, 660 P.2d at 749-50.
224. Hamlin, 102 Wn. 2d at 818, 689 P.2d at 1377.
225. 98 N.L 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
226. 486 A.2d at 1229.
227. Id. at 1229-31. Such intent may be embodied in a living will or in oral directives to family or
health care providers. Id. at 1229. The probative value of the evidence would depend on the remoteness,
consistency, and thoughtfulness of the prior statements or actions and on the person's maturity at the
time of the statements or acts. Id. at 1230.
228. Id. at 1231.
229. See id. at 1229, 1231. See also supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
230. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
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the treatment in question will merely prolong the patient's suffering, then
that treatment can be foregone. The surrogate must evaluate the same types
of medical evidence as in the subjective test,23' but he or she also must find
that the burdens of treatment in terms of pain and suffering outweigh
whatever benefits the patient might experience. 232 When there is no evi-
dence of the patient's wishes regarding terminal care, the second "best
interest" test must be met. This purely objective approach centers entirely
on evaluating the burdens to the patient. The surrogate must find that the net
burdens of the patient's life with treatment "clearly and markedly outweigh
the benefits that the patient derives from life,"' 233 and further, that the
presence of recurring, unavoidable, and severe pain of life with treatment
makes administering that treatment inhumane.
New Jersey's approach to surrogate decisionmaking reflected a realistic
awareness that terminally ill patients may or may not have previously and
conclusively expressed wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment. The
court also correctly recognized that the principle of individual choice
requires that, to the extent a patient's wishes are known, they should guide
surrogate decisionmaking, but the absence of such sentiment does not
preclude the withholding or withdrawal of treatment if necessary to pro-
mote patient welfare. Finally, the court evinced an understanding that all
terminal care decisionmaking should involve consideration of treatment
alternatives, and that whoever makes the decision must assess the impact of
the treatment's burdens and benefits.
The New Jersey court, however, wrongly confined its two "best interest"
methods of surrogate decisionmaking to situations involving a patient's
disproportionate experience of pain. Pain may not be a consideration for
many terminally ill patients because modern drugs and medical techniques
231. Id. at 1232.
232. Id.
233. Id. In comparison, Barber v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,491
(1983), proposes a "proportionate treatment approach":
[P]roportionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient, has at least a reasonable chance
of providing benefits to the patient, which benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the
treatment. . . .[A] treatment course which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonethe-
less be considered disproportionate to the potential benefit if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for
any significant improvement in condition.
Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
Other courts have used a "substitute judgment/best interest" approach to surrogate decisionmaking.
E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Town v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a broad discussion of
this approach, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 931-47; Rubin, supra note 8, at 22-28. But
courts' use of this two-pronged approach has been criticized. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 8, at
920-947 (courts have applied subjective decision-making standards in cases where there is no reliable
evidence of any previously expressed wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment by the patient; in such
cases an objective approach should have been used). See also Cantor, supra note 4, at 557.
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often can minimize pain.234 Pain is a subjective experience and difficult to
assess. 235 To require the presence of prolonged, constant, severe pain
before a surrogate can determine that life-sustaining treatment should be
foregone would preclude for many a dignified death. More than pain, many
patients fear becoming physically dependent for basic hygiene, depleting
wealth they desire to bequeath, or being remembered for how they died
rather than how they lived.2 36
A second, though less significant, shortcoming of Conroy is its preoc-
cupation with identifying three specific "test" points along what is in fact a
continuum of evidence regarding previously expressed patient intent. At
one end of this continuum are patients who have executed a detailed living
will. For them the surrogate's role will be largely administrative. 237 Other
patients, like Joseph Hamlin, will never express any opinion about terminal
care. Their surrogate decisionmakers should engage in a fully objective
assessment of all treatment burdens and benefits. 238 The majority of pa-
tients will fall between the two extremes. For them, a surrogate must make
an objective evaluation of medical criteria, treatment burdens and benefits,
and an assessment of subjective evidence regarding the patient's prefer-
ence. If the objective and subjective considerations suggest different re-
sults, evidence of patient preference should be ascribed weight according
to its strength and degree of reliability.
Decisions to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration can
be made according to this approach. Besides pain, a surrogate should
consider such objective factors as the extent of bodily invasion and loss of
independence imposed by the artificial sustenance, the potential for com-
plications, and the likelihood of emotional suffering. The surrogate will
consider first the patient's previously expressed wishes, and then, to the
extent necessary, make an objective evaluation of the burdens and benefits
of artificial sustenance to the patient. When a patient's prior expressions
indicate a choice to forego artificial nutrition and hydration, or when a
surrogate determines that the burdens of artificial sustenance outweigh its
benefits absent evidence of a contrary patient choice, artificial nutrition and
hydration should be foregone.
Washington should adopt Conroy's approach to surrogate decisionmak-
ing, with the understanding that evidence of patient preferences exists
234. PRsMIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 277-86.
235. Cantor, supra note 4, at 569.
236. Id. at 565-67. See also Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
222 (1984) (where the patient himself described his "unbearable, degrading, and dehumanizing"
existence, as well as "the humiliating indignity of having to have every bodily need and function tended
to by others").
237. See Annas, When Procedures Limit Rights, 15 HASTINoS CENTR REP. 24, 25 (1985).
238. Cantor, supra note 4, at 557-59, 563-71.
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along a continuum, and provided that a surrogate is required to consider all
aspects of continuing and terminating life-sustaining treatment. Pain
should not be a prerequisite to a surrogate's decision to refuse treatment on
a patient's behalf.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent medical advancements that offer dying patients extended survival
have generated complex policy issues. Patients' desires for legislative and
judicial protection of their right to forego the advancements of medical
science have conflicted with health care providers' fears of legal liability
and society's fundamental respect for the sanctity of life.
In two comprehensive decisions, the Washington Supreme Court recog-
nized the right of all terminally ill adults to forego medical intervention that
serves only to prolong the dying process. This right, according to the court,
is founded upon the common law's longstanding protection of bodily
integrity and self-determination, and state and federal constitutional pro-
tections of personal privacy. Washington's legislature asserted the same
principles of self-determination and privacy when it enacted the Natural
Death Act. Both the state's highest court and its legislature have realized
that modern social values and good medical practice do not demand that a
life afflicted with a terminal condition be sustained at all costs.
Decisions to forego artificial nutrition and hydration are indistinguisha-
ble from decisions to forego other forms of life-sustaining treatment. As
courts confronting the issue have often noted, artificial means of providing
sustenance are unlike typical human ways of satisfying fluid and nutritional
needs. Intravenous lines and feeding tubes are analogous to mechanical
respirators, about which there is widespread consensus that patients have a
right to forego-each treatment replaces an essential biological function,
and neither addresses the patient's underlying, incurable condition. For
patients unable to make their own choice, surrogate decisionmakers can act
on the patient's behalf.
Though the emotional symbolism of food is difficult to shed even in the
realm of complex medical care, the attempt to do so must be made by courts
and legislators as this symbolism can sometimes interfere with a dying
patient's interest in a humane, dignified, and comfortable death. Since
some patients are better served by not providing artificial nutrition and
hydration, 239 the emotional appeal of providing artificial sustenance to all
239. Not eating is natural to the terminally ill; anorexia is common among the dying. Zerwekh,
supra note 40, at 47-49. Dehydration can bring relief from distressing symptoms such as vomiting,
respiratory congestion, pressure from tumor swelling, and pain. Id. Reduced fluids serve almost as
natural anesthesia. Id. The need to restrain and sedate patients in order to maintain a feeding route can
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those unable to feed themselves is not persuasive. Accordingly, Washing-
ton's lawmakers and its courts must not retreat from their mutual, broad
recognition of the beneficial limits of modem medical science and the
importance of human dignity and personal choice in our society. Our
society is a compassionate one. Legal foreclosing of a patient's right to
refuse artificial nutrition and hydration would violate this treasured social
value.
Jacquelyn A. Beatty
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lead to increased anxiety and fear. Lynn & Childress, supra note 33, at 18-19. See also In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A. 2d 1209, 1236 (1985).
